This paper analyzes South Africa's Free Basic Water Policy, under which households receive a free water allowance equal to the World Health Organization's recommended minimum of 6 kiloliters per month. I structurally estimate residential water demand, evaluate the welfare e¤ects of free water, and provide optimal price schedules derived from a social planner's problem.
Introduction
As exempli…ed by the opening quote, it is di¢ cult to overestimate the signi…cance attached to running water in many developing countries. The provision of a¤ordable water to households requires not only developing the infrastructure for piped water and proper sanitation, but also determining the price of water for residential use. Throughout the developing world, governments and utilities are experimenting with various pricing structures, including unlimited free water (Tanzania before 1991), zero marginal rates with …xed fees (India, Pakistan, Zimbabwe, Kenya), uniform rates (Uganda), or standard block prices with multiple tiers (Ghana, Ivory Coast). 1 The literature has addressed the impact of adequate water supply on water borne diseases (Ivens, 2008) , as well as its connection to corruption (Anbarci et al., 2009 ) and di¤erent systems of government (Deacon, 2009 ). The choice of a pricing scheme, which has received little attention, has similar far-reaching implications and it is one of the central problems for local governments and utilities.
Water pricing is an especially salient issue in post-apartheid South Africa, where who has access to water and how much they are charged for it is closely tied to issues of social justice. After the democratic elections of 1994, every household's right to a monthly allowance of free water was codi…ed in the constitution. The resulting unique pricing scheme, the Free Basic Water Policy, was introduced in 2001 and provides 6 kiloliters of water per month at no cost to households, regardless of income or household size. While the term "free water" is sometimes used in the literature to describe a situation with zero marginal price where households pay a …xed fee for the …rst units of water, 2 the South African scheme, which is motivated by equity concerns and in which water is 1 A block rate structure is one that de…nes di¤erent unit prices for various quantity blocks. See Whittington (1992) , World Bank (1993) , Berg and Mugisha (2008) , and Diakite et al. (2009) for more information on the pricing practices in these countries. 2 For example, Gibbs (1978) , Dandy (1997) , Castro et al. (2002) , and Martinez-Espineira (2002). These pricing schemes are often used to make utilities'revenues more predictable, and the …xed fee tends to be large (often equal to the average price for a similar quantity on a di¤erent part of the tari¤ schedule) In other cases, utilities may have actually free, is one of a handful such policies in the world.
The goal of this paper is to analyze the welfare e¤ects of free water and provide an optimal pricing scheme. To do this, I collected a unique dataset containing seven years of monthly meter reading data for every household served by a local water provider (about 60,000 households) in a particularly disadvantaged suburb of the City of Tshwane (the metropolitan area around Pretoria, the country's administrative capital). The dataset contains rich price variation across 18 di¤erent tari¤ schedules, which allows the identi…cation of structural parameters and a counterfactual analysis without free water. I …nd that without government subsidy, the mean monthly consumption would decrease from 12.6 to 5.6 kl, which is below the clean water consumption recommended by the WHO. However, it is possible to reallocate the current government subsidy to form an optimal tari¤ without a free allowance, which would increase welfare while leaving the water provider's revenue unchanged. This optimal tari¤ would also reduce the number of households consuming below the WHO-recommended level of clean water.
The dataset used in this paper is exceptional in coverage and quality. I observe individual monthly meter reading data for every household served by a local water provider from January 2002 to December 2008. This is a low-income population where a large number of households have monthly water consumption near subsistence levels. This population is 99% Black, with monthly household income between 170-300 USD. About 17% of the households have running water but no sanitation, and over 30% consume not more than 6 kiloliters of water per month, which is the WHOrecommended clean water consumption for a 5 person household. Consumption is recorded using modern technology and is therefore observed without measurement error. The dataset provides a su¢ ciently long purchase history and over 3 million monthly observations, which contributes to a precise estimation and circumvents the typical problems of datasets used to estimate price elasticities in developing countries.
I observe administrative data on prices, and the seven-year period I consider contains much richer price variation than datasets used in similar studies. 3 During the observed period, the water provider experimented with 18 di¤erent tari¤ structures, leading to substantial changes in prices a small free tari¤ block for administrative reasons, e.g., to simplify billing for a vacant apartment where a minor leak or water testing produces positive consumption.
over and above the in ‡ation adjustments (including changes in the number of tari¤ blocks and changes from increasing to decreasing marginal prices). In addition, I take advantage of a 2007 policy experiment in which, in an e¤ort to cut costs, Tshwane's Water Department introduced a new pricing policy that raised the free water allowance for low-income households (from 6 to 12 kl) while removing the allowance for all other households, who therefore experienced a dramatic price increase. The rich price variation in the dataset allows me to identify the structural parameters of a demand model and perform a counterfactual analysis without free water.
Because the water utility uses a complex block pricing structure, reduced form estimation methods would result in biased estimates. Rational households base their consumption decisions on the entire price schedule rather than on a speci…c marginal or average price. In this sense, it is important to estimate the consumers'block choice in an integrated way. To identify the demand parameters necessary for a counterfactual analysis and the optimal pricing exercise, I pursue a structural estimation approach. To structurally estimate water demand under the complex block pricing system used in Tshwane, I use an extension of the Burtless and Hausman (1978) demand model developed for labor supply. This model assumes heterogenous preferences among households with an unobserved taste parameter in the utility function. As a consequence I am able to recover household-level marginal e¤ects and estimate household level price elasticities.
Applying the Burtless and Hausman (1978) model to water and other commodities with nonlinear prices raises several di¢ culties, some of which have been overlooked in previous studies of demand estimation. 4 First, while previous studies considered systems with continuously increasing or decreasing marginal prices, the schedules analyzed in this paper feature a combination of increasing and decreasing marginal prices and, as a result, the econometric model becomes more complex. I show how to proceed with the estimation and derive the maximum likelihood function under these conditions. Second, if convexity of preferences is not satis…ed, applying the estimation method mechanically will produce negative probabilities in the likelihood function. Because I work with an explicit utility structure, I am able to solve this problem by restricting the distribution of preference heterogeneity such that convexity is satis…ed. Considering these additions to previous estimation methods, this paper provides the most comprehensive demand estimation with nonlinear prices in the literature. The analysis can be directly applied to other markets with similar pricing structures, including electricity and wireless phone service.
In analyzing the Free Basic Water Policy, I study a counterfactual scenario in which consumers do not receive any free water. Currently, the water provider assigns positive accounting prices to free water in order to receive a subsidy from the central government. This allows me to analyze a counterfactual scenario where I replace the zero prices with these positive prices. I …nd that without free water, a high percentage of households would consume below the WHO-recommended level of 6 kl per month, with an average consumption of 5.6 kiloliters. Based on this result, I
conclude that the government subsidy is bene…cial in raising the amount of clean water consumed.
However, the current policy of providing some water for free is only one possible way of allocating the government subsidy. Is there a welfare-improving way to subsidize water consumption?
To investigate whether the pricing system of Tshwane can be improved, I consider an optimal pricing problem. I assume that a social planner maximizes consumers'total expected utility subject to the water provider's revenue and the total consumption being unchanged. The second constraint guarantees that the water provider's capacity constraint is satis…ed. I consider tari¤ structures with the same tiers as the one currently employed, with or without a free water allowance. I …nd that the optimal tari¤ contains gradually increasing positive marginal prices with no free allowance. This corresponds to the current government subsidy being spread more evenly across the lower segments. The optimal tari¤ increases welfare substantially while reducing the percentage of consumers with consumption less than 6 kl per month. The intuition behind increased consumption is that consumers currently attempt to stay within the free allowance in order to avoid paying the higher marginal prices. I calculate the compensating variation to compare households'welfare under the optimal tari¤ and the one currently in e¤ect. I …nd that in each given period, the average utility gain among households is about 1% of their income, or 10-20% of the amount spent on water.
Even though pricing the existing water supply is a central concern to policymakers in many developing countries, the majority of water-related papers in the development literature focus on the availability of water rather than on pricing. One major obstacle to demand estimation is the lack of data as individual meters are still not common in low-income areas of the developing word.
A group of studies attempt to overcome this di¢ culty by using surveys to evaluate households' willingness to pay for various water sources without observed consumption data. For example, Bank (1993) . One common di¢ culty is that respondents often do not understand the terms used in the surveys. 5 I am aware of two previous studies which are based on observed consumption data from a developing country. Diakite, Semenov, and Thomas (2009) study water demand data in Cote d'Ivoire using aggregate consumption data at the community level. Strand and Walker (2005) have access to billing data for about 1000 households from six cities across Central America. However, these observations come from di¤erent years and di¤erent months of the year (each household is observed only once), and it is unclear what population is represented by this data. To my knowledge, this is the …rst paper to estimate water demand using administrative, individually metered consumption data for large numbers of low-income households. 6 In summary, this paper makes four contributions to the existing literature. First, this is the …rst paper to analyze the welfare e¤ects of free water. Second, the quality and size of the dataset used to estimate water demand in a developing country, where consumption is near the WHOrecommended minimum, also makes this exercise unique. Third, my estimation handles price schedules with a combination of increasing and decreasing marginal prices and explicitly includes convexity conditions on preferences. Finally, I use the results of the structural estimation to derive optimal price schedules from a social planner's problem and I provide a structural statement about the welfare implication of the di¤erent price scenarios. 7 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the institutional context and introduces the dataset, Section 3 presents a reduced form analysis, Section 4 provides the demand model, and Section 5 presents the details of the structural estimation. Section 6 presents 5 Upon being asked about his maximum willingness to pay for water, one respondent in Haiti asked the interviewer, "What do you mean the maximum I would be willing to pay? You mean when someone has a gun to my head?" (World Bank, 1993, 49). 6 There are two studies about South African water consumption. Jensen and Shulz (2006) estimate water demand in Cape Town for 275 households using survey data and IV estimation, and Smith and Hanson (2003) present descriptive evidence from a survey of 120 households. Neither study uses a statistical method that properly addresses the block pricing structure, nor do they o¤er any analysis of the Free Basic Water Policy. 7 As Reiss and White (2005, 877) note, "Despite a great deal of work in the theoretical literature on e¢ cient nonlinear pricing schemes, there are as yet few (if any) detailed empirical studies." the estimation results and Section 7 provides the welfare analysis of the Free Basic Water Policy. Section 8 describes and analyzes an optimal price schedule, and Section 9 concludes.
Data and background
Most of the Tshwane metropolitan area is served by a national bulk water supplier. However, several smaller areas inside the municipality boundaries are served by smaller public utilities. The city council faced political and social pressure to improve the quality of life of households living in "townships" (poor suburbs / villages) in the area. One key aspect of the development plan was to create designated institutions focusing on servicing speci…c less-developed areas. One of these institutions, Odi Water, provides water to particularly under-developed townships in the NorthWestern part of Tshwane, where average monthly household income is less than 300 USD and over 99% of the population is Black. This area is a mixture of government housing projects and informal shacks. Piped water is available to all households, but 17% of the households have no water-using sanitation. In this sense, the area is a collection of typical South African townships in an urban area. The Appendix illustrates some of the relevant features of this environment.
Water consumption data
I collected the data used in this paper directly from Odi Water. This dataset contains monthly residential water billing data for all their customers, or about 60,000 households, for the period [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . All households in the dataset have individually metered running water on their property. 8 Since most of the area had no running water 10 years ago, the utility had to develop the entire infrastructure at that time. This included the installation of the individual meter reading devices using modern technology.
The …nal dataset includes 2,904,366 monthly observations, and was generated as follows. I dropped from the data Odi Water's commercial and institutional consumers (1 % of the data). I also dropped accounts showing zero consumption. 9 The employees of Odi Water inspect the water meter each month at meter-reading. If there is a problem with the meter, employees record the code of the problem which is also included in my dataset. Accordingly, I drop observations where 8 In particular, there are no shared connections. 9 In some cases zero consumption refers to vacant land, closed accounts etc., a total of 410,184 monthly observations. the meter reader recorded any problems which prevented properly reading the meter. 10 In addition, the meter reader tests the tap for any water leaks and reports the problem. I drop the observations with problems reported (1.3%). Because of the regular quality checks, illegal tapping in this area is virtually non-existent, in contrast to many other developing countries or even other parts of South Africa.
Based on my conversations with Odi Water o¢ cials, the utility has di¢ culty distinguishing commercial and residential consumers if the consumer is running a small business from his home.
These small businesses include hair salons, car washing facilities, small restaurants etc. Since Odi Water made e¤orts to identify these households and re-categorize them as commercial units, there are several account numbers whose status changed from domestic to commercial during the observed period. I drop the entire accounts with changing status from the sample (less than 0.5%). Lastly, I drop observations where monthly consumption is higher than 50 kl, which is 5 times the average consumption (2 %) These consumption levels are most likely associated with either unreported leaks or with commercial activities not yet categorized as such by Odi Water.
Given the sophisticated individual meters and Odi Water's tight quality control, the consumption data can be considered free of measurement error. 11 In addition, since I observe the entire population of consumers, the dataset is free of the selection problems which sometimes arise with survey data. 12 
Household characteristics
Income. Based on government documents, average household income is less than $ 300 in the entire area where Odi Water provides water. I do not observe household level income directly. 13 However, households need to register with the municipality as "indigent" to receive various government 1 0 These problems include the following: dirty dial, meter covered, meter stuck, meter damaged, meter dial is missing, meter tampered with, meter obstructed, water leak or meter removed. 1 1 In this area, no close substitutes for piped water are available. In particular, communal taps are only available in neighboring areas which do not have water connections, and there is no resale of piped water. 1 2 For example, the dataset of Mayer et al. (1988) , widely used in the water literature, contains about 1200 households from 16 di¤erent utility areas from the US and Canada surveyed by mail. In this dataset, 28.2% of the respondents had a BA degree, 13.3% a Masters degree, and 7.1% a Doctoral Degree. Not surprisingly, educated households were more likely to respond to a mail-in survey. There is a similar bias if we consider household income, home value, home size etc. since these variables are all correlated with educational attainment. 1 3 Based on my experience in the …eld, the possibilities for getting household level income data from townships are limited. Survey data would be misleading as information about household income is not shared among family members. Wives, who would be most likely to answer such a survey, frequently have no information about the actual monthly income of their husband. subsidies (such as discounted electricity), and I can identify the accounts of indigent households on a monthly basis. To qualify for indigent status, a household should meet the following criteria:
Total gross monthly income of all the members of the household does not exceed R 1700 (' $170), the applicant should be the owner of the property, and must be a South African citizen. 14 The percentage of registered households is stable at around 10 percent for most of the 7 year period, with a 3 percentage point increase in registration in the second half of 2007, when the utility discontinued the provision of free water without registration. I include a dummy variable for indigent households.
(Of course, even though registration is based on income, there might also be behavioral di¤erences among indigent and non-indigent households.) Some of the income variance among households is captured by the household level random taste parameter, as described in section 5.3.
Restriction. About 25% of the households in the Odi Water area receive restricted service.
Restriction will apply if the household has an unpaid balance for more than 40 days. The water ‡ow is limited using a wide range of restriction devices for these households. 15 The main reason for non-payment seems to be high water bills due to negligence, such as leaving the tap running throughout the day. Some households also use water for luxury items they cannot a¤ord, such as watering the lawn or a ‡owerbed in an arid African area. Restricted households get the 6 kl free water through a limited ‡ow. Until the balance is fully paid they have the option to prepay for additional kiloliters, which are added to the free amount and divided throughout the month by the controlled ‡ow. For this reason even restricted consumers may be price sensitive. The average duration of restriction is 5 months. In the estimation a dummy variable is included for restricted consumers for the duration they had the restriction device on their tap.
Sanitation. Odi Water serves several townships and areas in the North-Western part of Pretoria.
Some of the area is undeveloped, and households may have metered running water on their property but no water-using sanitation. 16 For these households, comprising 17% of the population, the municipality provides chemical toilets, or they use shared sanitation facilities. These households use on average 25 percent less water than similar households with water-using sanitation facilities.
In addition, they need to pay only water and not the separate sanitation charge (see the next 1 4 1 USD 10 South African Rand based on the January 2009 exchange rate. 1 5 Restriction means a water ‡ow of around 1 liter / minute, depending on the device. At this rate, it takes about 20 minutes to …ll a standard container used for bathing. 1 6 Households do not choose whether to have sanitation. Some areas simply lack the infrastructure necessary for sanitation, and all households have sanitation when it is available. Other characteristics. I observe detailed area codes and include three dummies (Area 1, 2 and 3) to capture possible di¤erences across neighborhoods. I also include the average maximum daily temperature per month to capture weather-related consumption changes. Table 1 shows the summary statistics.
Tari¤ structure
The tari¤ structure considered in this paper has a unique feature: It contains a mixture of increasing and decreasing block tari¤s. Because Odi Water needs to price water and sanitation separately due to accounting reasons, they designed the block tari¤ structures separately. Both charges are based on a single water meter reading, thus water and sanitation cannot be consumed separately.
Although both the water and the sanitation charge forms a regular increasing/decreasing price structure when taken separately, their sum does not follow any usual structure for block pricing. charge is paid. The multiplier changes with the consumption level, but this structure is …xed over the observed period. There is no sanitation charge for households without water-using sanitation facilities. Sanitation multipliers and summary statistics of the tari¤ structures are in Appendix 8.8.
Based on my experience in the …eld, the local government makes extensive e¤orts to advertise the tari¤ structure, and tari¤ changes when they occur. This includes special ‡yers as well as announcements in the local newspaper and at community meetings. In addition, the provider employs "education o¢ cers" who regularly educate households about di¤erent aspects of water consumption: they teach them about water conservation, explain how the water meter works and how to read the water bill, etc. Given these e¤orts, most households should have an adequate understanding of the prices they face.
As the above description of the tari¤ structures shows, Odi Water experimented with many di¤erent tari¤ structures over the years. Typical studies using US datasets have much less price variation, since US water tari¤s are usually …xed over time after adjusting for in ‡ation. Odi Water's frequently changing tari¤ structure provides another source of identi…cation in the data ( Note that for indigent households, comprising 11% of the data, I never observe positive prices for the …rst 6 kiloliters. However, there is no evidence of di¤erent consumption patterns between indigent and non-indigent households when they are facing the same tari¤ structure (see Table 4 ).
In the analysis below, I include a dummy variable for indigent households.
The mean consumption is 13.0 kiloliters. However, 28.7 percent of the households consume below the free allowance. There is a high concentration of consumers (15.4%) around the kink point of the free allowance (between 5-7 kiloliters). Even though the price schedule contains di¤erent prices for 42-72, 72-90, and 90+ kiloliters, less than 5 percent of the households consume more than 42
kiloliters. The distribution of the consumers by consumption is shown in Table 2 . literature, this section estimates a linear demand function with OLS, reviews why these estimates are likely to be biased, explains why some widely used IV methods are not able to correct this bias, and argues that it is crucial to introduce a structural model for further analysis of optimal consumption in the presence of complex nonlinear tari¤ structures.
In the reduced form regressions the dependent variable is monthly metered consumption, and the regressors are observed individual household characteristics (registration as indigent household, restriction, availability of water using sanitation on the property), weather characteristics (average maximum daily temperature) and the price of water. To include the complex price schedule in this regression, one has to use proxies, typically the average price for each unit of observed consumption, or simply the marginal price of observed consumption. Results using the average price are in Table   13 in Appendix 8.7.
The use of the average or marginal price in the OLS regression introduces an upward bias in the presence of increasing block tari¤s, and a downward bias when the block pricing is decreasing.
For example, an increasing block structure automatically creates a positive correlation between the marginal or average price and the error term, since above-average consumption levels are necessarily associated with higher prices. While under an everywhere-increasing or everywhere-decreasing tari¤ structure this bias can at least be signed a priori, this is not possible in my data featuring a mixture of increasing and decreasing price segments. 17 Several water studies attempt to …nd instrumental variables to correct the bias of the OLS estimates. The idea is to instrument the marginal or average price with various summary statistics of the nonlinear price schedule. For example, one might take, for each tari¤ year, the marginal prices corresponding to speci…c predetermined quantities (such as the kink points). The price variable is then instrumented with these characteristics of the price schedule. Essentially, this amounts to approximating the nonlinear price schedule with a linear function of the marginal prices. This procedure is valid to the extent that this linear approximation holds (so that the observed marginal prices are strongly correlated with the instruments) and to the extent that the error term is uncorrelated with the characteristics of the tari¤ structure used as instruments (so that the exclusion restriction is satis…ed). Results from this exercise are in the last column of Table   13 .
The above instruments are unlikely to be valid in the present context. First, there is no guarantee that the price schedule can be represented in a meaningful way using marginal prices or other summary statistics. As described above, the price schedule I analyze is the sum of a separate water and sanitation charge, both of which were subject to yearly reviews during the observed period.
Moreover, not just the marginal prices, but also the kink points were changed. Second, as the structural analysis below will make explicit, optimizing consumers base their choices on the entire price schedule. They choose the block in which to consume based on all the marginal prices, and the quantity consumed in a speci…c block based on the marginal price in that block. Therefore, if the error term contains a preference shock upon which optimizing consumers base their choices, it will be correlated with not just the marginal price of the observed consumption, but also with any other characteristic of the tari¤ schedule. Particular features of the price schedule, such as a list of marginal prices, are unlikely to be valid instruments. Finally, the histogram of consumption levels in my dataset features some clustering around the kink points (see more on this in Section 5 below). While this follows naturally from a framework with consumer optimization, reduced form regressions would require special assumptions on the error structure to be consistent with such a pattern. Therefore, I turn to a structural model of water consumption. Throughout, I also present the reduced form results for comparison.
Consumer choice under increasing or decreasing block prices
Consider a general model of a consumer facing a piecewise linear budget constraint. This generalizes the treatment in Burtless and Hausman (1978) or Mo¢ tt (1986) who focus on the case of everywhere increasing or everywhere decreasing prices. The consumer consumes water w and a composite good x, and his utility is U (w; x), where U is strictly quasi-concave and increasing in both goods. The tari¤ schedule is written as P (w): It is piecewise linear with a …nite number K of segments, where segment k has a marginal price P k between consumption levels w k 1 and w k (referred to as "kink points"):
::: ::: :::
Given income Y; the consumer solves the problem
where M (w) = w R 0 P (u)du is total expenditure on water. While this problem is conceptually straightforward, not every solution procedure is equally amenable to estimation. The following procedure will be particularly convenient.
To solve problem (1), consider …rst the sub-problems of maximizing utility as if the budget constraint was linear, extending each segment to the entire consumption set as show by the dashed lines on Figure 4 . For each segment k de…ne
and let e w k be the solution. Thus, V k and e w k are, respectively, the consumer's indirect utility function and demand function corresponding to the extended budget constraints. Next, compare the utility of the solutions which are feasible under the tari¤ schedule P (w); and the utility of the kinks w k , to determine the consumer's demand. For each kink k; let U k = U (w k ; Y M (w k )) be the consumer's utility from consuming at kink k. De…ne
k 2 = arg max k fU 1 ; U 2 ; :::; U K 1 g:
is the segment giving highest utility under the tari¤ schedule P (w); while k 2 is the highest utility kink. Consumer demand is
where dependence of demand on the tari¤ is made explicit. In words, (4) says that consumer demand is either a kink point, or it is the regular demand of a consumer facing a linear budget constraint with income Y M (w k 1 ) + P k w k 1 and price P k . The approach of solving the subproblem (2) corresponding to each segment is useful because the tari¤ structure is not di¤erentiable, and not necessarily convex. The lack of di¤erentiability prevents the use of …rst order conditions at the kink points. The lack of convexity means that, on the segments, the …rst order conditions of the consumer's problem (1) may yield multiple solutions.
Consider for example Figure 4 . In this example, the best choice on segment 2 (point A), is a local optimum. But it is not a global optimum. There is another local optimum on segment 3 (point B)
that is preferred to segment 2. The problem arises here because the tari¤ is not convex. Of course, over a particular linear segment, the problem is convex, so I can use the …rst-order approach on a particular segment to solve subproblem (2). Then, by solving (3), I obtain the global optimum.
5 Speci…cation and estimation
Demand speci…cation
To obtain a linear demand function for convenient estimation, I assume that the consumer's direct utility function can be written as 18
Here, Z represents observed consumer characteristics and contains a set of dummy variables such as the availability of water-using sanitation or indigent status, and is a vector of corresponding parameters. The role of the parameters < 0 and > 0 will be made clear below, and the term represents household level heterogeneity (see below). Under (5), preferences are convex if and only if w + < 0. Since there are two goods and two parameters ( and ), the functional form in (5) is ‡exible in the sense that the two parameters can be chosen to provide a …rst-order approximation to an arbitrary utility function at a given point (w; x): 19 Given a linear budget set with income Y and price P , the indirect utility function and demand function corresponding to (5) is
Equation (7) makes it clear that and are, respectively the price and income coe¢ cients in the demand function. Using this speci…cation, we may write demand on segment k as e w k = e w(P k ; Y M (w k 1 )+P k w k 1 ); and the corresponding utility as
This speci…cation gives rise to the following econometric form of the consumer's demand (4):
> :
1 8 A similar functional form is used by Hausman (1980) . 1 9 In addition, each household characteristic Z has a corresponding parameter :
Here, w it is monthly consumption of household i in billing cycle t. Households have an individual meter on their properties and they pay a monthly bill, so there are no data aggregation issues either across time or among households. Household level heterogeneity is modeled as a time-varying term it (preference error). This is observed by the household but not by the econometrician. Finally, " it is a random optimization error not observable by either the households or the econometrician. For example, it might represent leaks not noticed by the households or other unforeseen events causing desired consumption to di¤er from actual consumption.
To see why introducing the optimization error is necessary note that, given some distribution of , the theory predicts (i) a zero probability of consuming at non-convex kink points, and (ii) a strictly higher probability of consuming exactly at a convex kink point than in a small neighborhood around it. By contrast, my data shows some clustering of consumption around the kink points.
The error term " will contribute to explaining consumption in the neighborhood of convex kinks as well as consumption at non-convex kink points.
In standard demand estimation, it and " it cannot be distinguished, but that is not the case in the present context. When utility is maximized on a segment, observed consumption contains two error terms, as in (8) . When utility is maximized at a kink point, observed consumption is equal to the kink value plus the optimization error only, since the preference error is already "included"
in the kink point (Hausman, 1985) .
The social planner' s problem
As mentioned in the introduction, the optimal pricing of water is a major concern for governments and water providers throughout the developing world. To study this issue, I use the estimated parameters to derive an optimal pricing schedule from a social planner's problem. Speci…cally, I
consider the problem of a social planner maximizing total consumer welfare subject to the following constraints:
1. (Revenue neutrality) The water provider should operate with the same economic loss/pro…t than under the current (2008/2009) price scheme, assuming a risk neutral water provider.
(Capacity constraint)
The new tari¤ structure should not increase the current total consumption.
I also take as given the eight tari¤ tiers of the current schedule. This formulation is useful since I do not have information about the speci…cs of the production cost of the water provider. 20 It implies that the possible welfare changes come from the reallocation of the current consumption and payments across consumers.
In addition to the two constraints described above, I also investigate the e¤ect of restricting the …rst price block (0-6 kiloliters) to have zero marginal price. Speci…cally, in a separate exercise, I
provide optimal price schedules where the …rst marginal price is zero all households or for indigent households only.
Because of the random taste parameters it , consumer welfare in a given year is a random variable. The optimal tari¤ will be one which maximizes the expected welfare of consumers subject to the revenue and capacity constraints holding in expectation. I assume that the marginal cost of water distribution is zero, and restrict attention to increasing price schedules.
Denote the current total revenue with R =
where I is the number of consumers and P 08 (w) is the current (2008/09) price schedule. Similarly, let current total consumption
. Let F i denote the cdf of i and E the expectation operator over ( 1 ; :::; I ).
The problem of the social planner is
s.t.
As above, F i ( ) is assumed to be truncated-Normal, where the truncation i depends on individual consumer characteristics. For example, for the case of two price segments with P 1 > P 2 ;
each term in (9) can be written as
Here, the three terms correspond to the utility the consumer achieves from consuming on the …rst segment, the kink, or the second segment, respectively. Using the parameter estimates together with the functional forms in (5) and (6) and the distribution of (speci…ed below), numerical maximization of (9) subject to (10) is straightforward.
Estimation
I now derive the econometric form of the demand function based on (8) for the situation shown in Figure 4 . The demand function for the 8-segment tari¤ schedules I observe in the data can be derived similarly. First, consider the following notation:
From the conditions in (3), consuming on a particular segment or kink requires two types of conditions to hold: the speci…c quantity has to be (i) feasible, and (ii) yield higher utility than other feasible quantities. Using the functional form in (6), these conditions can be written as follows.
First, the regular demand corresponding to segment 1, w 0 1 + , is (i) feasible i¤ < 11 , and (ii) yields higher utility than the demand w 0 3 + corresponding to segment 3 if
whenever 23 < . Note that here feasibility of w 0 1 + implies that neither the kink nor w 0 2 + is feasible, so these are all the conditions we need.
Next, it is easily checked that V (P 1 ; Y ) = V (P 3 ; Y 0 3 ) has a unique solution in ; which we denote 13 . It is also easily veri…ed that V (P 1 ; Y ) > V (P 3 ; Y 0 3 ) i¤ < 13 : Therefore, the kink point w 1 is feasible when 11 < < 12 , and optimality requires that U 1 > V (P 3 ; Y 0 3 ) whenever 23 < : From (5) and (6) it may be veri…ed that
, where u L 13 < u U 13 are the two roots of the equation
These observations may be used to derive the corresponding conditions for segments 2 and 3, yielding the following speci…cation of observed consumption:
w 0 1 + + " if < 11 and ( < 13 when 23 < ); 
A more general version of (13) can be found in Appendix 8.6. It is also shown there that the demanded quantity in (13) is uniquely de…ned for any .
Once a distribution for " it and it is speci…ed, (13) can be used to estimate the parameters of interest using Maximum Likelihood. Two features of the above framework make this exercise non-trivial.
First, as explained in Section 4, the presence of a mixture of increasing and decreasing prices requires comparing the utility of feasible and only of feasible ordinary demands. This is apparent in (13) , where, e.g., a positive probability of observing w 0 1 + + " requires that < 13 (w 0 1 + yield higher utility than w 0 3 + ) only if 23 < also holds (w 0 3 + is feasible). This introduces considerable computational di¢ culties beyond the case of everywhere-increasing prices (where no comparisons are necessary) or everywhere-decreasing prices (where performing all comparisons at once yields valid results).
Second, a di¢ culty arises from the recognition that demand in (13) to hold, the substitution e¤ect of the change in price from P 1 to P 2 must not be dominated by spends about 0.4 percent of its monthly income on water. 22 In contrast, in my dataset the average monthly consumption is 13 kiloliters, and households spend 5-10 percent of their monthly income on water. Based on this fact, income e¤ects might be substantial and there is no reason to expect the convexity constraint not to bind.
In the framework used here, convexity can be guaranteed by performing the estimation subject to the constraint that W + < 0. Under (5), this is necessary and su¢ cient for preferences to be convex. Rewriting this constraint using (8) and (12), we get < w 0 k : To guarantee that this holds for every segment, we require that < min k ( w 0 k ) : Note that this automatically guarantees that preferences are convex over kink points w k for which w k < w 0 l for all l, i.e., for all the kink points at which the consumer might possibly want to consume. Since w 0 k di¤ers across billing periods t and consumers i, in practice I impose
The truncation point i di¤ers across consumers (but is the same for a consumer in all billing cycles). I specify the distribution of it as truncated-Normal, from a Normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 2 ; truncated at i . Appendix 8.1 explains the truncation in more detail.
Truncation guarantees that demand is unique for every consumer, even for counterfactual realizations of that would result in consumption on di¤erent segments of the budget constraint. This will allow me to perform counterfactual experiments in a consistent manner. In the literature on utilities the only paper I know of that addresses the problem of uniqueness is the electricity demand estimation of Herriges and King (1994) . However, their solution amounts to imposing convexity only in the neighborhood of observed consumption levels. This is problematic because if uniqueness of demand is not guaranteed for all possible values of the preference error, expected consumption cannot be computed. 23 This makes any counterfactual analysis impossible.
To derive the likelihood function based on (13), I assume that it is i.i. of the computational complexity, the estimation must be done on a subsample of the data. 24 I draw a random sample of 10,000 monthly observations and the subsequent estimation is done for this sample. Out of sample tests are performed. Appendix 8.4 contains a step-by-step summary of the estimation procedure. Table 3 presents the parameter estimates from the maximum likelihood estimation. All parameters are signi…cant at the 1 percent level, and the signs of the parameters are as expected. To further interpret the e¤ect of variables on the expected consumption marginal e¤ects need to be calculated, which will be done in the next section. The mean truncation point for the normal distribution is 3.267, which is not a drastic truncation for a normally distributed random variable. Table 4 presents actual means computed form the data and the model-predicted mean consumptions for di¤erent consumer groups. The average error is not substantial, the model performs well. Looking more closely at the distribution of consumption predicted by the model, I …nd that the model underestimates high consumption levels (above the 95th percentile). This is due to the long right tail of the distribution of water consumption in my dataset.
Results

Parameter estimates and model performance
To investigate the out-of-sample performance of the model, recall that the dataset contains the 2007 policy change when the free allowance was increased to 12 kl for low-income households but removed for the rest of the population. The new tari¤ resulted in a considerable decrease in the average price for low-income households, while other households experienced an increase in average price. I estimate the model only for a pre-policy sample, and use these parameter estimates to predict consumption after the policy change. Table 5 presents the model predicted means after the policy, which are close to the actual means observed in the data.
An important feature of the data after the 2007 policy change is a decrease in average consumption in response to an increase in the free allowance. In particular, Figure 5 suggests that some indigent households consuming more than 12 kl before the policy decreased their consumption below 12 kl after the policy was introduced to avoid paying the higher marginal prices. 25 This is of course consistent with a model of rational consumer behavior in the presence of nonlinear prices, where the consumer chooses both the price segment and water consumption on that segment. In- deed, Table 5 shows that the model used here is able to predict the decrease in consumption. Note however that, under this policy, the average price for consuming less than 27 kl actually decreased (see Figure 3 ). Not surprisingly, as the …fth column shows, a regression where the nonlinear price schedule is proxied by the average prices cannot explain the decrease in consumption following the policy change.
More generally, the …ndings reported above provide evidence that in the poor South African townships considered here consumers do take into account the nonlinearities in their price schedule, and choose the price segment on which to consume. This is in contrast to the …ndings of most US studies. For example, Borenstein (2008) writes that "it seems likely that the vast majority of [electricity] customers in California not only do not know what tier their consumption puts them on, but even that the rate structure is tiered at all" (page 25). 26 To the extent that my …ndings generalize to other developing countries, they have two main implications. First, in these environments, complex pricing schedules may have an impact, and consequently changes in prices or in the amount of free water provided can have substantial welfare e¤ects. Second, future studies analyzing demand under nonlinear price schedules should choose the estimation method taking into account this potential di¤erence between developed and developing countries. In particular, modelling the block choice seems to be especially important in the latter case. 
Marginal e¤ects and price elasticities
To interpret the e¤ect of our variables on expected consumption, marginal e¤ects need to be calculated. This is the e¤ect of a unit increase in a given explanatory variable on monthly consumption, holding everything else constant. For dummy variables, it is the e¤ect of a uniform change in the variable (from 0 to 1). Marginal e¤ects can be obtained by recalculating the model (optimal consumptions at di¤erent marginal prices with the corresponding income and the probability that the consumer will consume on that segment) for a change in each explanatory variable. I calculate household level marginal e¤ects, and then average across households to get the average marginal e¤ect. I do this separately for indigent non-indigent households as well as the restricted group. The results are in Table 6 .
The magnitudes of the estimates are reasonable. Indigent households consume less on average.
Having water-using sanitation increases average monthly consumption by 2.1 kl.
Following the literature, I de…ne the price elasticity under block prices as the percentage change in household consumption resulting from a one percent increase in each price block. Since I have zero prices in the …rst block in most tari¤ years, I change those prices from 0 to 1 Rand. The …rst column of Table 7 shows the average household level price elasticities.
The results show that households respond to price changes, with an average price elasticity of For comparison, the second column of Table 7 shows price elasticity estimates from the OLS regression speci…ed in Section 3. As can be seen, the OLS estimates cannot capture even the correct sign of the price e¤ect. households that use more water. One explanation of this …nding is that high consumption is associated with higher income levels where the total expenditure on water is a smaller percentage of household income, and these households are therefore less price sensitive. 27 Alternatively, this …nding might be a consequence of the free water allowance. In some years, indigent households consume more water on average, and for them water is free until 12 kl, so the e¤ect of a one percent price change in each segment is softened by the zero prices. When designing an optimal price schedule (see Section 6.4), this relationship suggests that welfare may be higher if the marginal price changes are larger for households using more water.
It is di¢ cult to compare the elasticity measures above to previous estimates as studies typically 
Analyzing the Free Basic Water Policy
The most interesting question from a development perspective is how consumption and expenditure would change in the absence of the free water allowance. One of the di¢ culties in answering this question is to determine the unobserved positive prices which would replace the zero marginal prices. Fortunately, in the case of Odi Water, this can be done in a straightforward manner. The
Free Basic Water Policy is subsidized by the central government. When the utility sets the tari¤ structure, they report a positive "e¤ective price" for the block with 0 consumer price, and this e¤ective price forms the basis of the rebate received from the central government.
In a counterfactual exercise, I replace zero prices from 2002-2008 with the e¤ective price the utility reports to the government, holding everything else constant. 28 Results are shown in Table   9 . Note that the change in consumption is computed keeping everything else constant. Speci…cally, the marginal prices of the di¤erent segments were left intact, which also means that the size of the cross-subsidies among di¤erent groups of consumers are unchanged. In this counterfactual scenario, consumption decreases substantially. Average consumption is 5.6 kl, which is 56% lower than under the current policy with the free allowance. The decrease in consumption is driven by the change among non-indigent households, whose price elasticity is higher (see Table 7 ).
In this counterfactual experiment, the average consumption of 5.6 kl is just below the WHO recommendation of 6 kl clean water per household. Health concerns associated with insu¢ cient consumption of clean water are particularly relevant in the South African case due to the constant threat of cholera outbreaks. As recently as 2008-09, a cholera outbreak in Zimbabwe, South Africa, Angola and Mozambique killed more than 1,000 people and a¤ected another 32,000. 29 The spread of this disease can be easily constrained with such simple measures as washing hands with clean water after using toilets or before preparing food. It is thus particularly important that the pricing policy ensure that households consume enough clean water, and discourage them from supplementing their water needs by fetching water from contaminated sources such as rivers and streams.
With detailed information on the health risks associated with consuming speci…c quantities of clean water, it would be possible to quantify the health implications of proposed and actual 2 8 Note that this counterfactual exercise is di¤erent from the actual 2007 policy change where free water was taken away from a large number of households but the rest of the price schedule was also changed substantially. 2 9 The Weekender, January 17-18, 2009, p1. Optimal tari¤ Description OT 1 Eight-tier tari¤. The blocks are the same as in the current price schedule. Same tari¤ structure for all households. All prices obtained from the optimization problem. OT 2 OT 1 but P 1 = 0 for indigent households.
policies. 30 Clearly, the valuation of these e¤ects, including the externalities associated with any diseases, is important to assess the overall welfare implications of water pricing policies. In this sense the above results regarding the impact of a free water allowance on consumption are a …rst step towards establishing the social value of free water. In the pricing exercise below, I restrict attention to consumer utility derived directly from water consumption.
Optimal pricing scheme
The previous section suggests that government subsidies are important to raise the consumption of clean water in this setting. But is a free water allowance the best way to provide such a subsidy?
To investigate this issue, this section solves the social planner problem introduced in Section 5.2.
In this problem, total expected consumer welfare is maximized subject to a revenue and a capacity constraint. I consider two di¤erent optimal tari¤ structures. The …rst is an eight-tier tari¤ structure with the same kink points as in the actual tari¤, where all eight prices follow from an optimization problem as in (9)-(10). The second structure modi…es this benchmark to include the 6 kl free allowance for indigent households, while the other prices follow from the social planner's problem. Table 10 summarizes these two cases. 31 For this exercise, I ignore households without sanitation, since they have a separate water schedule without sanitation prices. The calculations below are performed using a random sample of 1000 households.
The resulting optimal tari¤ structures are shown in Figures 6 and 7 . In contrast to the current tari¤ structure, the prices in the optimal tari¤ schedules are lower in the …rst …ve blocks and higher in upper blocks. The price di¤erence between blocks is also higher than in the current schedule.
3 0 It should be noted that the 2007 policy change which removed the free allowance for non-indigents also led to a substantial increase in the fraction of households consuming less than 6 kl water (from 27.3 to 37.1%).
3 1 I also ran the optimalization routine assuming price structures where every household receives 6 kiloliters for free. There were no feasible solutions. The reason is that the provider's revenue signi…cantly increased after the 2007 policy change and this increased revenue cannot be guaranted with the reintroduction of free water. Table 11 shows the change in mean consumption among di¤erent consumer groups under the three di¤erent optimal tari¤ structures. Since the optimization was done under the constraint that total consumption should not exceed the current total consumption, there is little change in the total mean consumption among tari¤ structures. However, there are large di¤erences in the distribution of consumption. Both OT 1 and OT 2 reduce the proportion of consumers under 6 kiloliters. In particular, under OT 1, only 6.5% of households consume under the WHO-recommended 6 kiloliters despite the fact that the free allowance has been removed. In this price structure, the price for the …rst 30 kiloliters is lower than under the current tari¤. The consumption increase is the consequence of the marginal price decrease on these segments. Relative to OT 1, introducing the free allowance in OT 2 not only reduces welfare, but also raises substantially the proportion of consumers under 6 kl.
I calculate the compensating variation to measure the change in consumers'welfare as a consequence of the introduction of the new tari¤ structures. Speci…cally, I calculate the change in a consumer's income that equates utility under the current (2008/09) price schedule and expected utility under the alternate price schedules (OT 1 or OT 2). For example, for two price segments (11) implies that the compensating variation C is de…ned implicitly by
where U 0 is the baseline utility level. A negative value of C indicates that the consumer is better o¤ than under the baseline. Expenditure changes and the compensating variation are in Table 12 In summary, an optimal tari¤ structure with no free allowance raises welfare, and substantially lowers the proportion of households under the WHO-recommended 6 kl.
Conclusion
This paper analyzes the welfare e¤ects of free water using the South African Free Basic Water Policy.
It provides the most comprehensive demand estimation with nonlinear prices in the literature on public utilities and derives optimal pricing schedules using the structural estimates. The dataset stands out in quality and coverage among usual datasets used to estimate water demand from Second, I …nd that the optimal tari¤ schedule does not contain zero marginal prices, but rather divides the government subsidy more evenly across blocks. The continuously increasing eight-tier tari¤ structure I derive also reduces the percentage of consumers below 6 kl, improving the situation of those who consume the least water.
Finally, under block prices, economic theory suggests that consumers should take into account the marginal prices on di¤erent segments. However, some empirical studies …nd that consumers respond to average prices or total expenditure rather than marginal prices. My results provide evidence that consumers are rational in their decisions in this setting. This result underscores the importance of estimation methods that are able to capture utility-maximizing behavior and, from a policy perspective, justi…es the application of complex price schedules in this setting. 8 Appendix
Truncation
For a demanded quantity W , the utility function in (5) is quasiconcave around W only if
If this fails, demand may not be uniquely de…ned for a given set of parameter values, and we cannot proceed with the estimation. Assume that demanded quantity falls on segment k:
Then demand is unique i¤ < w 0 k : To guarantee that this holds for every segment, we require
Note that this automatically guarantees that preferences are convex over kink points w k for which w k < w 0 l for all l, i.e., for all the kink points at which the consumer might possibly want to consume. Since w 0 k di¤ers across billing periods t and consumers i, in practice I impose
The truncation point i di¤ers across consumers (but is the same for a consumer in all billing cycles). As is clear from (14) , restricting the distribution of is the only way to guarantee that demand is uniquely de…ned for all possible realizations of the data. For example, if has full support on ( 1; +1); (14) will fail with positive probability for any < 1:
There are several options for choosing the distribution of i to be consistent with (14) . The most natural extension of the previous literature, and one that makes computation of the likelihood function tractable, is to let i be drawn from a truncated normal distribution with truncation point i for each consumer. To economize on the number of parameters to be estimated, I assume that the un-truncated "parent"distribution of i is the same for everyone: N (0; 2 ): Denoting and the standard normal density and cdf, respectively, this yields the following speci…cation of the cdf, pdf, mean and variance of i :
Likelihood function
Let = + " and let F x and f x denote, respectively, the cdf and pdf of the random variable x.
Based on (13), for each observed monthly consumption level W , the contribution to the likelihood may be written as
The …rst sum in (19) is the probability that W is observed given that desired consumption was located on one of the segments k = 1; 2; :::. Each term in the sum is the density of at W w 0 k times the probability that desired consumption was located on segment k: H k and L k are the upper and lower bounds of for which this is the case. The second sum is the probability that W is observed given that desired consumption was at one of the kink points k = 1; 2; :::. h k and l k are the bounds on corresponding to kink k. The log-likelihood function is the sum, for each observed monthly consumption level W , of the logarithms of the corresponding expressions (19) .
Terms in the second sum in (19) corresponding to the kink points may be rewritten using (15) and the fact that
since " N (0; 2 " ). For the …rst sum in (19) corresponding to the segments, we need to …nd f and
To …nd f , use the convolution of f " in (20) and f in (16) to get
After some algebra, this can be shown to equal
Expected consumption
Expected consumption can be written as
where the …rst sum is the expected consumption on the segments times the probability that each segment is chosen, and the second sum is each kink times the probability that it is chosen (0 if the kink is concave). These probabilities can be computed using the cdf of in (15) . The expected
Estimation procedure
The demand estimation procedure described in Section 5 is computationally complex. The following describes the step by step instructions to estimate the demand function in the case of a mixture of increasing and decreasing tari¤s. The procedure can be implemented in MATLAB or using similar software.
The following steps should be iterated from initial starting values for the parameters ( ; ; ; ; " ) using any minimization procedure until convergence is achieved. To make sure that a root exists, I …rst compute the value of for which @V =@ = @U=@ .
Equation U (w i ) = V (P j ; Y 0 j ) has two roots i¤ at this value of ; V j < U i , in which case I proceed to compute the roots numerically starting the search from a su¢ ciently low or from a su¢ ciently large starting point. If V j > U i for this value of , then U (
2. Establish the feasibility conditions for each segment and kink as described in (13) using jk calculated in 1(a).
3. Combine the feasibility and optimality conditions for each segment and kink, as described in Section 5.1, by taking the maximum of the lower bounds and the minimum of the upper bounds.
Denote these values (L k ; H k ) and (l k ; h k ) for segments and kinks, respectively.
4. Substitute in the likelihood function as described in Appendix 8.2.
5. Choose ; ; and " to minimize the objective function. Iterate. 3) shows, this assumption can be relaxed to requiring that points of discontinuity have zero probability. Inspection of (21) shows that continuity of the likelihood function is satis…ed.
Consistency of the MLE
Condition 3 is the condition for the Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem. In the standard case when the likelihood function is di¤erentiable, this theorem guarantees that integration and di¤erentiation of the likelihood function can be interchanged, which is used to show that the expected score is zero under the true parameters (e.g., Greene, 2000, p475) An important class of problems for which this condition fails is when the support of the dependent variable depends on the parameters. In my case, this might appear to be a problem because the support of depends on the parameters due to the assumed truncation. However, note that the dependent variable also contains the optimization error " which is distributed normally. Thus, the support of W is ( 1; +1) regardless of the parameters.
Finally, Conditions 4 and 5 are conditions on the parameter space and the sample which we assume to hold. Note that this theorem does not require the di¤erentiability of the likelihood function.
Uniqueness of the demanded quantity for any
As long as preferences are convex, we know that demand exits and is unique for any kinked budget.
(More precisely, uniqueness is true 'almost surely', ignoring the case when a convex indi¤erence curve has two tangency points with a non-convex part of the budget. Not to deal with this situation is standard.). This means that demand is unique for any , and it is either w 0 1 , w 1 ; w 0 2 , or w 0 3 , since these are all the possibilities under the speci…c 3-part budget considered here. The conditions given in (22) are necessary for each of these cases to obtain. 
Each condition has two parts: (i) feasibility (consumption on the budget), and (ii) optimality (higher utility than the 3 other possibilities if they are feasible). In most cases, (ii) can be simpli…ed, as done in (22) . For example, w 0 1 is demanded i¤ it is feasible and yields higher utility than w 1 ; w 0 2 and w 0 3 : In this case, feasibility of w 0 1 implies that neither w 1 nor w 0 2 is feasible, so optimality simpli…es to V (P 1 ; Y ) V (P 3 ; Y 0 3 ). Clearly, these conditions are mutually exclusive (because of the optimality conditions). Therefore they are also su¢ cient for each case to obtain.
I now illustrate this with the speci…c functional forms resulting in (13) . That is, I show that, for any ; (13) uniquely de…nes a demanded quantity (without gaps or overlaps). Under convexity, we know that 11 < 12 < 22 ;
where the second inequality follows from w 1 < w 2 , and the …rst from the fact that w 0 2 w 0 1 = (P 2 P 1 )( + w 1 ) < 0 since P 2 > P 1 and + w 1 < 0 from convexity. We don't know anything about 23 , since w 0 3 can be anywhere on the extended budget constraint with P 3 : Thus, there are 4 possible scenarios: Consider the …rst one, and check that, for each possible (13) gives exactly one solution (and we can do the same for the other three scenarios). Denote the conditions in (13) for demand to be on the …rst segment, the kink, or the two other segments S1, K1, S2 and S3.
When 23 < 11 < 12 < 22 , we have the following possibilities (summarized in Figure 8 ).
If < 23 : Only S1 holds (and since 23 < does not hold the value of 13 is irrelevant).
Observed consumption is predicted to be w 0 1 + + ": Observed consumption is w 0 3 + + ": Figure 8 summarizes the consumer's observed consumption as a function of for this scenario.
The other 3 scenarios can easily be checked in the same way. Figure 9: Water-using sanitation for a typical household in the data
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